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What this investigation is about
1 The Student Loans Company (the Company) administers loans and grants to 
students at universities and colleges across the UK. It processes around 1.8 million 
applications a year, and has more than 8 million customers repaying or due to repay 
loans totalling over £100 billion.
2 The Company is funded primarily by grant-in-aid. The Company is a 
non-departmental public body, which until June 2016 was sponsored by the Department 
for Business, Innovation & Skills. From July 2016 the Company has been sponsored by 
the Department for Education (the Department). The Company is also registered with 
Companies House and is owned by four shareholders, with the Department owning 
85% and the devolved administrations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland each 
owning 5%.
3 The Student Loans Company appointed Mr Steve Lamey as its chief executive 
officer on 1 June 2016. Two members of Company staff made formal allegations about 
Mr Lamey to the Department and Company in May and July 2017. The Company 
suspended Mr Lamey in July 2017. The Department and Company commissioned 
two independent investigations into the allegations. These were conducted by the 
Government Internal Audit Agency and Sir Paul Jenkins KCB QC (Hon). A timeline 
of events is at Figure 1 on pages 6 and 7.
4 Following internal processes, including a hearing panel and an appeal, the 
Company dismissed Mr Lamey, without compensation, on 7 November 2017 for gross 
misconduct in public office, including breach of four of the seven Nolan principles and 
failure to adhere to HM Treasury’s Managing Public Money guidance. Mr Lamey does 
not agree with the findings of either of the investigations, or with the disciplinary and 
appeal panels.
5 From summer 2017, the Department told us about the allegations made by 
whistleblowers and the actions being taken by both the Department and the Company. 
In the light of the two investigations, the conclusions of the Company’s disciplinary 
process, and the related parliamentary interest, we judged that there was sufficient 
concern that we needed to examine the Department’s oversight of the Company, and 
that it would be in the public interest to do so. This investigation describes the events 
surrounding Mr Lamey’s appointment and dismissal. It sets outs the Department’s 
role in oversight of the Company and how it responded to the concerns raised by the 
two Company staff. We have not re-investigated the allegations made by those staff. 
We have also not evaluated the original decision to dismiss Mr Lamey or the findings 
of the subsequent appeal.
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6 We take the protection of whistleblowers seriously. We have therefore not included 
details that could identify them. In preparing our report we consulted the whistleblowers 
on the content and presentation of their involvement in advance of publication. We also 
agreed with the potential whistleblower the presentation and content of their account.
7 This report describes:
• the appointment, performance management and dismissal of Mr Lamey (Part One);
• the Department’s oversight arrangements (Part Two); and
• the Department’s plans to improve its oversight of the Company (Part Three).
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Figure 1 shows the timeline of events in the Department for Education’s oversight of the Student Loans Company
Figure 1
Timeline of events in the Department for Education’s oversight of the Student Loans Company
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of the investigation reports of the Government Internal Audit Agency and Sir Paul Jenkins, 
and Department for Education and Student Loans Company documents
Apr–Jun 2016 Jul–Sep 2016 Oct–Dec 2016 Jan–Mar 2017 Apr–Jun 2017 Jul–Sep 2017 Oct–Dec 2017
Jun 2016
Mr Steve Lamey appointed 
as chief executive of 
Student Loans Company 
on one year’s probation
Nov 2016
Mr Lamey criticises the 
Student Loans Company’s 
human resources function at 
a management conference
10 Feb 2017
Student Loans 
Company makes 
executive redundant 
without approvals
Jul 2016
Machinery of 
government changes 
transfer oversight of 
Student Loans Company 
from the Department for 
Business, Innovation & 
Skills to the Department 
for Education
Jan 2017
Appraisal meeting held. 
Mr Lamey’s behaviour in 
the meeting is later found 
to amount to bullying
Mar 2017
Mr Lamey criticises 
Student Loans 
Company in front of 
key stakeholders at 
a conference
Apr 2017
Mr Lamey restructures 
the executive leadership 
team leaving no qualified 
member responsible 
for finance
8 Apr 2017
Student Loans Company 
occupies a new building 
without a Cabinet Office 
approved lease
May 2017
Whistleblower 1 makes 
formal allegations to 
Department for Education
26 May 2017
Government Internal 
Audit Agency asked to 
investigate whistleblower 
1’s allegations by Student 
Loans Company and 
Department for Education
31 May 2017
End of Mr Lamey’s 
probationary period
7 Nov 2017
Mr Lamey dismissed 
for gross misconduct 
following a disciplinary 
hearing and an appeal
Jul 2017
Whistleblower 2 makes 
formal allegations to 
the Student Loans 
Company’s chair
11 Jul 2017
Mr Lamey suspended 
as chief executive and 
accounting officer
12 Jul 2017
Student Loans Company 
and the Department 
for Education engage 
Sir Paul Jenkins to 
investigate whistleblower 2’s 
allegations
20 Sep 2017
Government Internal Audit 
Agency report completed
28 Sep 2017
Sir Paul Jenkins’ 
report completed
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Summary
Key findings
The appointment, performance management and dismissal of the chief 
executive officer
1 The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) had concerns about 
appointing Mr Lamey, which led to the Student Loans Company (the Company) 
appointing him with an extended probationary period. The appointment panel 
identified only one appointable candidate, Mr Lamey. BIS had concerns about the 
absence of other suitable candidates to act as benchmarks. Having obtained and 
considered references from Mr Lamey’s employment at HM Revenue & Customs, 
which he left in 2012, BIS officials initially recommended to ministers that the recruitment 
process should be re-run, a recommendation which the Cabinet Office supported. 
Following advice from the special adviser for appointments, and a meeting between 
Mr Lamey and the minister, BIS subsequently revised its advice to include an alternative 
option of appointing Mr Lamey with an extended probationary period, to partially 
mitigate the concerns it had identified. Ministers agreed that the Company could appoint 
Mr Lamey, subject to an extended probationary period of one year. The Company’s 
board agreed Mr Lamey’s appointment (paragraphs 1.2 to 1.8).
2 Neither BIS nor the Department for Education (the Department) believed 
that the probationary arrangements would be an effective test of Mr Lamey’s 
performance, and did not fully implement all recommended measures to support 
and oversee Mr Lamey. The Company’s chair agreed with BIS that he would assess 
Mr Lamey’s performance monthly during the one-year probationary period. However:
• the chair informed BIS at the time that he had “significant reservations around 
the probation clause”. In his view an extended probation clause did not set “the 
right context for the start of a relationship of trust between a chair and a chief 
executive officer”;
• although the board was aware of the probationary period, the only person at the 
Company aware of BIS’s concerns, and that the probationary period was extended 
as a result, was the chair. Mr Lamey had argued successfully that his extended 
probationary period should not be disclosed to anyone else at the Company;
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• the chair told us he sought feedback informally from executives but they were not 
clear on the purpose of the feedback they were being asked to provide. Neither the 
chair nor the Department believed that this process would be effective in identifying 
concerns; and
• we found evidence that the Department was aware of three monthly monitoring 
meetings between the chair and Mr Lamey during the year. The chair told us that 
he had further monthly monitoring meetings with Mr Lamey, but could not provide 
written minutes, which were required by Mr Lamey’s contract. The Department has 
not provided evidence that it was aware of further meetings taking place.
BIS suggested additional measures to ministers, such as identifying a non-executive director 
of the Company to work with the chair to oversee Mr Lamey’s performance. BIS made the 
Company chair aware of these suggestions, but the Company did not implement all of them 
and the Department did not review the arrangements (paragraphs 1.10 to 1.14).
3 Two Company employees formally made allegations about Mr Lamey in 
May and July 2017; and each reported being well supported by the Department, 
with each set of allegations resulting in a separate independent investigation. 
The allegations included concerns about Mr Lamey’s management and leadership 
style. The Department and Company chair undertook to treat both individuals as 
whistleblowers. The individuals told us that, once they had made the allegations 
formally, the Department contacted them within hours, and provided good support. 
The Department and Company jointly commissioned two separate investigations into the 
allegations. The Government Internal Audit Agency investigated the allegations made by 
the first whistleblower and Sir Paul Jenkins KCB QC (Hon) investigated the allegations 
made by the second (paragraphs 1.17 to 1.18). 
4 The Company dismissed Mr Lamey on 7 November 2017 for gross misconduct 
in public office. In March 2017 the chair was positive about Mr Lamey’s performance in 
his annual appraisal, concluding that he had “an excellent first 10 months”. In October 2017 
a disciplinary hearing found that Mr Lamey had breached: the Nolan principles of public 
life; Managing Public Money guidance; the Company’s code of conduct and values; and 
provisions in the framework document setting out the terms of the relationship between the 
Department and the Company. The specific findings of the hearing included that Mr Lamey 
had failed to protect a potential whistleblower and had a management and leadership 
style which amounted to a failure in leadership. Mr Lamey appealed against the decision. 
The appeal upheld the initial decision to dismiss. The Company dismissed Mr Lamey on 
7 November 2017, and the Department simultaneously removed his status as accounting 
officer (paragraphs 1.15 and 1.17 to 1.41).
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On the Department’s oversight
5 There were many changes in the Company during 2016, but the Department 
did not consider whether its oversight arrangements were sufficient. During 2016 
oversight of the Company transferred from BIS, the Company appointed a new chief 
executive officer and replaced most of its non-executive directors. Mr Lamey, with 
the board’s approval, also restructured the executive leadership team, reducing the 
executive leaders’ attendance at board meetings and therefore their interaction with 
the Department’s assessors. He stopped providing the board with a separate report 
from the executive director responsible for finance. The Department did not reassess 
the appropriateness or effectiveness of its oversight arrangements in response to these 
changes (paragraphs 2.14 to 2.15).
6 Accountabilities, roles and responsibilities for the Department’s oversight 
of the Company are not up to date and lack clarity. No sponsoring department has 
updated the framework document, which sets out the terms of the relationship between 
them and the Company, since 2009. Officials from the Company and Department also 
told us they are not clear about the role of representatives from the Department on the 
board and other committees or the extent to which they should be observing, advising 
or intervening in the Company’s business. We identified similar concerns in our overall 
review of government departments’ oversight of arm’s-length bodies in June 2016 
(paragraphs 2.8 to 2.12).
On lessons learned
7 The Department is reviewing the governance and structure of the Company, 
with the first phase to be completed by June 2018. In phase one, the Department 
is working with UK Government Investments to examine how the current governance 
arrangements are operating, whether they work well, and whether they could be 
improved in the short to medium term. The Department has not yet set out the detailed 
scope of phase two, during which it intends to examine the Company’s longer-term 
operating model. The Department is also reviewing its relationships with all of its 
arm’s-length bodies, which it aims to complete by January 2019 (paragraphs 3.1 to 3.4). 
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Part One
The appointment and tenure of the 
chief executive officer
The appointment of Mr Lamey as chief executive officer
1.1 The Student Loans Company (the Company) chief executive officer is appointed 
by the Company’s board with the agreement of the Secretary of State. 
1.2 In 2015 the Company employed a firm of head-hunters to recruit a new chief 
executive officer. In March 2016, following interviews, an appointment panel, including 
the Company chair and representatives from the Department for Business, Innovation & 
Skills (BIS), identified Mr Lamey as the only appointable candidate.
1.3 The head-hunters obtained references from three individuals who worked 
with Mr Lamey while he was at HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), where he worked 
until 2012. Mr Lamey’s most recent employer declined to provide references. Mr Lamey 
was a self-employed consultant from May 2013. The head-hunters did not seek 
references from his clients.
1.4 In March 2016, BIS officials advised ministers that the references from HMRC 
raised questions about Mr Lamey’s ability to build the right relationships, trust and 
rapport, particularly given the complex stakeholder relationships he would need to 
manage – one element of the person specification for the role. BIS advised ministers 
that, in the absence of a strong field of candidates against which to benchmark his 
performance, it would be too risky to appoint Mr Lamey. Officials recommended 
re-running the recruitment process. 
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1.5 In April 2016, the special adviser in BIS responsible for advising the Secretary of 
State on appointments questioned the fairness and accuracy of the HMRC references 
received as they were anonymised and, in her view, did not support the conclusion 
that Mr Lamey should not be appointed. She also raised concerns about the cost 
of re-running the recruitment process. 
1.6 The special adviser showed BIS a copy of Mr Lamey’s 2011-12 performance 
appraisal from HMRC, which stated that his achievements put him “in top performer 
territory”. In relation to Mr Lamey’s ability to build the right relationships, his HMRC 
appraisal gave examples of strong joint working with another department and 
commented positively on his leadership approach. BIS officials told ministers that the 
appraisal was “generally very strong”, but quoted one significant negative comment 
from the appraisal regarding collaborative behaviours. The appraisal had additionally 
explained that this was in an internal setting and largely reflected Mr Lamey’s frustration.
1.7 On 14 April 2016, Mr Lamey met the minister to discuss the role. Subsequently, 
BIS provided revised advice to ministers that either the Company could be asked 
to re-run the recruitment process, or it could appoint Mr Lamey permanently if he 
passed an extended period of probation. BIS also recommended additional safeguards 
(paragraph 1.10). The minister confirmed that he would like Mr Lamey to be appointed 
to the role if appropriate measures to handle the concerns identified were in place.
1.8 The Company board approved Mr Lamey’s appointment on 27 April 2016. 
On 3 May 2016, the then Prime Minister approved Mr Lamey’s appointment subject to 
satisfactory completion of an extended one-year probationary period. On 1 June 2016 
the principal accounting officer at BIS wrote to Mr Lamey to confirm his appointment as 
accounting officer at the Company.
1.9 Mr Lamey’s employment by the Company began on 1 June 2016. His objectives 
reflected the need to lead the Company through significant change. The job specification 
noted that the Company was midway through a programme of transformation to 
increase resilience, flexibility and efficiency. Also, that the Company had a very significant 
change portfolio to deliver, including reforms of the higher education student finance 
system and the sale of the student loan book.
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Performance management arrangements
1.10 In their advice to ministers on 20 April 2016, officials from BIS advised that a one-year 
probationary period would partially mitigate their concerns about the appointment. 
They suggested four additional measures: an early meeting with ministers to discuss 
priorities; identifying a non-executive director of the Company to work with the chair to 
oversee Mr Lamey’s performance; asking the chief executive officer of another BIS body 
to mentor Mr Lamey; and setting clear objectives for Mr Lamey that put equal weight on 
delivery and relationship-building. BIS shared these suggestions with the Company chair.
1.11 BIS and the Company implemented two of the four additional safeguards 
BIS suggested:
• Mr Lamey met with ministers shortly after his appointment to discuss priorities.
• Neither BIS nor the Company identified a non-executive director to support the 
Company’s chair. The chair told us that the non-executive directors in post at the 
time were new to the Company and, in most cases, to the public sector and had 
insufficient experience of managing chief executive officers.
• The Department told us that a mentor for Mr Lamey was not identified because 
of the transfer of oversight of the Company from BIS. 
• Mr Lamey’s objectives did include measures to: build and improve the Company’s 
health by providing strong leadership and continuing to enhance the cohesiveness 
of the executive leadership team; and build, maintain and enhance strong 
relationships with key stakeholders.
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1.12 The Company chair accepted the recommendation for a one-year probationary 
period, and the Company included it, supported by monthly performance monitoring 
meetings, in Mr Lamey’s contract. However, the chair told us that Mr Lamey had argued 
that the extension of his probationary period should not be disclosed to anyone else at 
the Company. When the board approved Mr Lamey’s appointment it was aware of the 
one-year probationary period, but the Company chair was the only member who was 
aware of the concerns raised in his recruitment which led to this. The chair informed 
BIS in May 2016 that he had “significant reservations around the probation clause”. 
Also, in his view, that an extended probation clause did not set “the right context for 
the start of a relationship of trust between a chair and a chief executive officer”. The 
chair and Department also told us that they believe upwards feedback arrangements, 
in this case with staff providing feedback to the chair on the chief executive officer’s 
performance, are ineffective. 
1.13 BIS, and then the Department, therefore relied on the chair’s monthly performance 
review meeting as the principal way of assessing Mr Lamey’s performance. The chair 
told us that he held monthly meetings with Mr Lamey, apart from in February 2017 as 
he was ill. The meeting in November 2016 was cancelled. Mr Lamey’s contract required 
these meetings to be minuted, however the Company and Department only have a written 
record of three monitoring meetings, held in July and October 2016 and January 2017. 
The chair could not provide written minutes of the other meetings. The Department has 
only provided evidence that it was aware of the three minuted meetings taking place. 
The meeting for March was superseded by the annual appraisal process.
1.14 The minutes of the three meetings record largely positive feedback about Mr Lamey’s 
progress. Mr Lamey’s contract said that the meetings were to assess: his performance 
against business indicators; his attendance; and compliance with the Company’s code 
of conduct. The chair told us that he had consulted internal and external stakeholders 
informally as part of his reviews. He talked to members of the Company’s executive team 
about Mr Lamey’s performance, but they were not always aware that they were being 
asked for formal feedback and did not raise concerns, although many have since told 
us that they had them.
1.15 At the end of March 2017, Mr Lamey received a positive annual appraisal from the 
chair. The chair concluded that Mr Lamey had “an excellent first 10 months”.
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1.16 The Company neither extended nor confirmed conclusion of Mr Lamey’s probationary 
period. In April 2017, the remuneration committee agreed that it was appropriate for 
Mr Lamey’s probationary period to end at the due date of 31 May 2017. The chair therefore 
told the board in May 2017 that he would confirm Mr Lamey’s permanent employment 
at the end of the probationary period. The first allegations about Mr Lamey, including 
concerns about his management and leadership style, were made to the Department 
formally in mid-May 2017 and notified to the chair on 24 May 2017, just after the May board 
meeting. The chair told us that he then advised Mr Lamey that, as a result of the allegations, 
he was not in a position to confirm that the probationary period had been concluded 
satisfactorily. The chair confirmed this to Mr Lamey by email on 23 June 2017.
How concerns were raised
1.17 In mid-May 2017 the Department’s officials heard concerns about Mr Lamey 
and other members of the executive team from a member of the Company’s staff. 
On 24 May 2017 an official from the Department told the Company chair about the 
staff member’s concerns. The Department, with the Company, commissioned an 
investigation from the Government Internal Audit Agency (GIAA). In late May and 
early June GIAA interviewed the member of staff, provided the Department with details 
of the allegations and agreed terms of reference. The investigation then began on 
15 June 2017. The GIAA investigated 12 allegations from the first whistleblower.
1.18 In early July 2017 the chair told the Department that further allegations about 
Mr Lamey had been made by a second whistleblower. The Department and the 
Company commissioned a second investigation, by Sir Paul Jenkins KCB QC (Hon), 
into these allegations. His investigation began on 20 July 2017. Sir Paul Jenkins 
investigated 57 allegations and points given in evidence, each made by one or 
more witnesses including the second whistleblower. Both investigations reported in 
September 2017. During July and August 2017, the Department’s principal accounting 
officer made his own inquiries into Mr Lamey’s behaviour. The Department and 
Company chair undertook to treat both individuals as whistleblowers. The individuals 
told us that, once they had made the allegations, the Department contacted them 
within hours, and provided good support.
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Disciplinary action leading to Mr Lamey’s dismissal
1.19 On 4 October 2017 the chair informed Mr Lamey of the grounds for the Company 
taking disciplinary action, in writing, and provided Mr Lamey with copies of the GIAA 
and Jenkins reports. In line with the Company’s disciplinary procedure, a disciplinary 
hearing took place on 16 October 2017. The hearing was chaired by a member of the 
Company’s board. The disciplinary panel considered five areas of concern from the 
GIAA report, and six areas of concern from Sir Paul Jenkins’ report. The number of 
areas of concern does not directly relate to the number of allegations made, because the 
investigation reports and the disciplinary panel grouped a number of allegations together 
in reaching their conclusions and the investigations did not uphold all of the allegations. 
The note of the disciplinary hearing states that the chair of the panel could “…come to 
no other conclusion than to recommend to the [Company] that [Mr Lamey] should be 
dismissed as CEO of the [Company] for gross misconduct in public office”. 
1.20 Mr Lamey appealed against the decision. His appeal was heard by a different 
board member on 1 November 2017, supported by a director from HMRC’s human 
resources function. The appeal panel agreed with the conclusions of the disciplinary 
hearing. The Company dismissed Mr Lamey from the chief executive officer position 
on 7 November 2017. On the same day, the Department’s principal accounting officer 
wrote to Mr Lamey to remove his accounting officer status, stating that he would have 
probably done so even if Mr Lamey had not been dismissed. Mr Lamey does not agree 
with the findings of either of the investigations or with the disciplinary and appeal panels. 
Findings of the investigations, the disciplinary proceedings and 
the appeal
1.21 The disciplinary panel found that Mr Lamey had breached: four of the seven Nolan 
principles of public life (integrity, objectivity, accountability and leadership); failed to carry 
out his role as the Company’s accounting officer; and did not adhere to HM Treasury’s 
Managing Public Money guidance, the Company’s code of conduct, its values or its 
framework document. The appeal panel considered and reported on the areas of 
concern in upholding the disciplinary panel’s decision, which were Mr Lamey’s:
• failure to protect a potential whistleblower;
• approach to decision-making and procurement;
• leadership and management;
• language and tone in an appraisal meeting;
• criticism of the Company and colleagues; and
• failure to have a finance director on the executive leadership team.
Further, the appeal panel concluded that “with so many cases now evident, 
it appears as though a management catastrophe… was inevitable”.
Investigation into oversight of the Student Loans Company’s governance, and management of its former chief executive Part One 17
Failure to protect a potential whistleblower
1.22 We take the protection of potential whistleblowers seriously. We have therefore 
not included details that could identify them. In preparing our report we agreed with the 
potential whistleblower the presentation and content of their account.
1.23 There were concerns about the way in which Mr Lamey treated a potential 
whistleblower. The GIAA investigation found that, on the balance of probabilities, actions 
were taken to prevent them from raising their concerns. The GIAA reported that both 
Mr Lamey and another senior member of staff were warned that the individual may raise 
concerns, and that those concerns would be taken seriously and investigated. The GIAA 
investigation found that Mr Lamey and the senior member of staff also knew from advice 
that they received that the actions were not appropriate. 
1.24 The disciplinary panel, based on the GIAA report, upheld concerns about how the 
potential whistleblower was treated. The appeal panel concluded that the actions taken 
were an extraordinary act, that Mr Lamey was aware of the individual’s concerns and 
that he should have exercised greater care to protect a potential whistleblower. 
Approach to decision-making and procurement
Lease on the Europa building
1.25 Concerns were raised about how the decision to lease a new building, the Europa 
building in Glasgow, was taken and whether the decision had been appropriately 
approved. GIAA concluded on the balance of probabilities that Mr Lamey provided 
an unrealistic timeframe for the acquisition of a new lease on the Europa building 
and that, as a result, procurement processes were not followed at an early stage. 
In addition, detailed financial comparisons were not undertaken and the finance team 
was not actively involved in the process to a level that would have been expected. 
Sir Paul Jenkins heard evidence from Mr Lamey that, up against a deadline and with 
serious risks from delay, he “went ahead without final completion of what he called the 
Government Property Unit ‘paperwork’”. Sir Paul Jenkins’ report found nothing in the 
allegation that Mr Lamey pressed ahead with the acquisition of the Europa building 
without either proper needs and cost analysis or approvals. The GIAA report accepted 
that, overall, the building lease is good value for money.
1.26 The disciplinary panel concluded, based on the GIAA report, that Mr Lamey failed 
to obtain the required Cabinet Office approval for the lease.
18 Part One Investigation into oversight of the Student Loans Company’s governance, and management of its former chief executive
Redundancy payment to an individual
1.27 Concerns were raised that Mr Lamey had made a member of the executive 
leadership team redundant without obtaining the necessary approvals from the 
Cabinet Office. The GIAA investigation found that, on the balance of probabilities, 
Mr Lamey failed to ensure that the correct financial processes were followed in 
making redundancies within the Company. The report stated that a settlement and 
confidentiality agreement was also signed, contrary to Cabinet Office requirements. 
The report stated that the chair of the remuneration committee confirmed that, contrary 
to Company policy, the redundancy had not been agreed through the remuneration 
committee and the appropriate approvals had not been requested. GIAA also found that 
the Department was not consulted about this redundancy, and necessary approvals 
from the Department and Cabinet Office were not sought or obtained.
1.28 Sir Paul Jenkins reported that nobody could tell him categorically that approval 
from the board or remuneration committee was needed for the specific package that 
was the subject of the allegation. He reported that there was insufficient evidence for 
him to conclude that this was a breach of the relevant standards.
1.29 While noting Sir Paul Jenkins’ findings the disciplinary panel concluded, based on 
the GIAA findings, that required approvals for redundancy payments and settlement 
agreements were not obtained.
Procurement
1.30 Concerns were raised that the Company had let contracts without the required 
approvals. The GIAA concluded that as accounting officer, Mr Lamey was aware that 
the Company took shortcuts in some procurement exercises. It found that senior 
managers exerted pressure to deliver procurement quicker than was necessary to 
allow correct processes to be followed. The GIAA investigation found no evidence that 
procurement was influenced by personal relationships or for the personal gain of any 
Company employees.
1.31 The disciplinary panel concluded, based on the GIAA investigation, that 
procurement processes were circumvented, and that there were occasions when 
a “strong direction towards appointments of suppliers without appropriate competition 
has occurred”.
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Failure to meet chief executive officer accountability requirements
1.32 There were concerns about the way in which Mr Lamey discharged his chief 
executive officer accountability requirements. The disciplinary hearing concluded that, 
overall, Mr Lamey appeared to have adopted a ‘risk-based’ approach rather than a 
compliance-based approach necessary to his role as chief executive officer of this 
particular organisation. The report stated that he may have found the latter frustrating 
and a hindrance in his desire to force necessary change throughout the Company, but 
that failing to comply with guidance was not an option open to him or one he should 
have adopted.
1.33 The appeal panel found that:
• in the situations regarding redundancy and the building lease, Mr Lamey chose 
to take an autocratic approach that, in the event of any controversy, obstacle, or 
difficulty, would have left him, the Company and the relevant executive leadership 
team members unnecessarily exposed;
• there were several opportunities for Mr Lamey to mitigate risks simply by obtaining 
approval from a higher authority, such as the Department, not only protecting 
himself and the Company, but also, most importantly, the subordinates on whose 
advice he was too reliant;
• with respect to redundancy, Mr Lamey’s evidence that “this was the first time the 
Company had done this” should have provoked and heightened the requirement 
for him to seek and obtain approval, and exercise compliance and diligence;
• while Mr Lamey asserted that being an arm’s-length body meant that he had a level 
of independence from the Department, this does not excuse his actions. The panel 
concluded that referring to arm’s-length body status as a defence is disingenuous 
as the Company is very clearly a publicly owned organisation;
• the Company therefore has to operate with the very highest levels of integrity. 
In two significant cases – one relating to a severance payment and one relating to 
a building lease – that integrity was compromised, for which the chief executive 
officer must take full responsibility; and
• Mr Lamey’s approach was risk-based as opposed to compliance-based. 
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Leadership and management 
1.34 Concerns were raised about Mr Lamey’s leadership, his behaviour and the 
behaviour of some senior members of staff. The GIAA investigation found some 
unacceptable management practices, which it considered, on the balance of 
probabilities, supported some of the allegations of bullying, harassment and poor 
management behaviours. The GIAA reported that there was evidence of cultural 
issues within the Company at a senior management level. For example, that testimony 
alluded to individuals being fearful or penalised for challenging the decisions of senior 
executives. The GIAA considered that this was further demonstrated by the noticeable 
reluctance of a number of witnesses to provide detailed information and by two 
witnesses asking if they could talk to GIAA ‘off the record’. Sir Paul Jenkins concluded 
that Mr Lamey’s failure to control bad behaviours among the executive leadership team 
and some aspects of his treatment of executive leadership team members, which made 
them wary of speaking up or challenging him, showed poor leadership and was a 
breach of Nolan principle 7 (leadership).
1.35 The disciplinary panel used the evidence from the GIAA and Sir Paul Jenkins’ 
reports of inappropriate behaviour in recommending Mr Lamey’s dismissal.
Language and tone in an appraisal meeting
1.36 Concerns were raised about Mr Lamey’s language and tone in an appraisal meeting. 
Sir Paul Jenkins concluded that Mr Lamey’s behaviour during an appraisal meeting with 
a senior member of staff in January 2017 amounted to bullying. The individual reported 
the incident to the Company’s human resources department at the time, but did not want 
to take their complaint further. To respect the individual’s wishes, the relevant human 
resources official did not tell others in the Company or the Department about the incident. 
It came to the Department’s attention through the investigations.
1.37 The disciplinary panel concluded, based on Sir Paul Jenkins’ report, that 
Mr Lamey’s language and tone not only breached the Company’s code of conduct, 
but also Mr Lamey’s legal obligation to treat staff in a manner consistent with his duty 
of trust and confidence. The appeal panel reported that, with respect to this incident, 
it does not doubt the findings of the investigations, however, given the strength of 
Mr Lamey’s denial, it relied less on this incident in reaching its conclusions.
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Criticism of the Company and colleagues
1.38 Concerns were raised that Mr Lamey knowingly made inaccurate and exaggerated 
criticisms of the Company and colleagues. Sir Paul Jenkins found that:
• Mr Lamey criticised the Company, including exaggerating how often customer calls 
were mishandled, in front of key stakeholders at a conference on 21 March 2017; 
• Mr Lamey’s criticism of human resources staff at a conference in November 2016 
was demoralising to staff; and
• Mr Lamey repeatedly used various inaccurate and exaggerated narratives.
Sir Paul Jenkins found these criticisms amounted to a breach of Nolan principle 7 
(leadership) and were unfair to many of the staff and so also constituted a breach of 
Nolan principle 3 (fairness). 
1.39 The disciplinary panel concluded, based on Sir Paul Jenkins’ findings, that 
Mr Lamey’s criticisms of the Company and colleagues were unfair and amounted 
to a failure of leadership. 
Absence of a finance director on the executive leadership team
1.40 Concerns were raised as to whether the member of the executive leadership 
team responsible for finance was suitably qualified for that role. Sir Paul Jenkins’ 
report cited Managing Public Money, which states that the finance director of a public 
sector organisation should: have board status equivalent to other board members; 
report directly to the permanent head of the organisation; and be a member of the 
senior leadership team, the management board and the executive committee (and/
or equivalent bodies). Mr Lamey’s restructuring of the company’s executive leadership 
team resulted, from April 2017, in no qualified executive director responsible for finance 
at executive leadership team level or reporting to the accounting officer.
1.41 The disciplinary panel concluded, based on Sir Paul Jenkins’ report, that this 
was a breach by Mr Lamey of the framework agreement and of his accounting 
officer responsibilities. 
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Part Two
The Department for Education’s oversight
2.1 In this part we look at:
• the main features of the system of oversight;
• formal governance documents;
• the Department for Education’s (the Department’s) assessment of risks 
to oversight; and
• the Department’s awareness of decisions. 
The Department’s system of oversight
2.2 Officials represent the Department at the Student Loans Company (the Company) 
board and other meetings (Figure 2).
The Company’s main governance arrangements
2.3 The Company’s board is responsible for ensuring that there are effective corporate 
governance arrangements that set out how the Company is directed and controlled and 
which provide assurance on risk management and internal control. It is also responsible 
for ensuring that the Company complies with any statutory or administrative requirements 
for the use of public funds. The board is supported by two sub-committees:
• The audit and risk committee, chaired by a non-executive director, supports 
the board on matters relating to internal control and governance and associated 
assurance matters. The audit and risk committee’s terms of reference are set out 
in the 2009 framework agreement. The committee is supported by an in-house 
internal audit service. The external audit is provided by KPMG. 
• The remuneration and nominations committee (referred to as the remuneration 
committee) supports the board on all matters related to the appointment and the 
remuneration of executive directors, including the chief executive officer. 
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Figure 2 shows Student Loans Company forums from 2016 to 2017
Figure 2
Student Loans Company forums from 2016 to 2017
Whitehall Group
(until January 2017)
Membership: Company chair and 
chief executive, representatives 
from the Department for Education, 
devolved administrations and other 
government departments.
Role: reports to the Department for 
Education’s executive board and 
shareholders group any risks or 
issues it has been unable to resolve 
that will have a significant impact 
on the Department.
Remuneration and 
nominations committee2
Membership: Non-executive directors. 
Department for Education representatives 
attend as assessors but are not members.
Role: supports the board on the 
appointment and remuneration of 
members of the executive leadership 
team, including the chief executive officer.
Board
Membership: Non-executive directors and the chief executive. Department for Education 
representatives attend as assessors but are not board members.
Role: Overall responsibility for the strategy and operations of the Company. Appoints 
and manages the chief executive officer.
Executive leadership team
Membership: executive directors from the 
Company.
Role: controlling and monitoring the Company’s 
operational and financial management.
Quarterly shareholders meeting
(from May 2017)
Membership: Company chair and an 
executive, representatives from the 
Department for Education, devolved 
administrations and other government 
departments as needed.
Role: reports to ministers on the 
Company’s progress towards 
delivering on ministerial strategy 
and objectives.
Audit and risk committee
Membership: Non-executive 
directors. Department for Education 
representatives attend as assessors 
but are not members.
Role: supports the board on 
matters relating to internal control 
and governance and associated 
assurance matters.
Delivery Quad1
Membership: Company executive 
chair, the Company’s policy and 
planning team, the Department for 
Education, representatives from the 
devolved administrations.
Role: reports to the Company’s 
executive on the Company’s capacity 
and ability to deliver its commission.
Notes
1 Chaired by the Department for Education until February 2017. Since chaired by the Student Loans Company.
2 From early 2018 called the remuneration, people and organisational design committee.
Source: National Audit Offi ce analysis of Department for Education and Student Loans Company documents
Oversight forums
Student Loans Company (the Company) 
Reporting
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2.4 Five out of eight of the Company’s non-executive directors joined the board 
in March 2016, just before Mr Lamey joined. Two more left in June 2016. The 
non-executive directors have a range of experience in business, but limited exposure 
to running public sector organisations. Board members and the Department agree that 
the balance of skills and public sector experience needs to be improved. Non-executive 
and executive directors told us that initially they had not understood public-sector 
governance methods and how these differ from the private sector.
The Department’s links with the Company
2.5 There are several ways in which the Company maintains a relationship with 
the Department through formal attendance at meetings of various forums (Figure 2). 
The Department contributes to governance of the Company through assessors, who 
attend main board meetings on behalf of the government shareholders. The assessors 
may also attend meetings of sub-committees of the board.
2.6 The Department has a team that sponsors the Company on its behalf; the 
two senior members of the team are the Department’s assessors of the Company. 
The assessors’ role includes providing assurance on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance and whether there is any need to intervene. They also assist the board 
in understanding the minister’s aims and objectives, advise on whether the minister 
needs to be consulted, and assure the minister and principal accounting officer about 
the operation of the services, performance and value for money. They advise on 
appointment of the chair, chief executive officer and non-executive directors, and assess 
the performance of the chair for the purpose of reappointment. 
2.7 When the Company transferred from the Department for Business, Innovation 
& Skills (BIS) to the Department, the sponsor team transferred too, maintaining 
continuity. Two of the three senior individuals have since moved on. In interviews with 
us, Company executives were critical of the amount of contact that they had with the 
Department immediately after its transfer from BIS. The sponsor team now has monthly 
meetings with the Company chair, fortnightly meetings with the Company chief finance 
officer, and weekly discussions with the interim chief executive officer. The relationship 
now is described by both sides as good and improving. Company executives 
acknowledge that the sponsor team works hard to help them respond to constant and 
significant policy developments. Some Company executives found the Department 
slow to respond to queries and told us that the Department has not dedicated sufficient 
resources to the sponsorship role.
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2.8 To support the assessors, the Department’s finance, digital and human resources 
teams liaise with their counterparts in the Company. They offer support and technical 
advice. The finance team approves and monitors the Company’s budgets. The digital 
team approves business cases for technological changes and helps to develop strategy. 
The human resources team supports the Company with its pay arrangements and attends 
the remuneration committee. Officials from the Company told us that they are not always 
clear about the role of representatives from the Department, for example, whether they are 
there to observe, advise or take decisions. The officials from the Department who normally 
act as assessors told us that they are clear about their role. One other Departmental 
director told us that they were not clear about their role and another, that although 
they were clear what they could do based on limited time available, their role was not 
necessarily understood by the Company.
Formal governance documents
2.9 In our review of government departments’ oversight of arm’s-length bodies in 
June 2016 we concluded that accountabilities, roles and responsibilities for arm’s-length 
bodies are not always clear, risking confusion and tensions.1 Given the varying degrees 
of independence that different arm’s-length bodies have, it is essential that both 
departments and arm’s-length bodies are clear about who is responsible for what. 
Framework documents between departments and arm’s-length bodies should clearly 
set out the terms of the relationship and be updated regularly.
2.10 The Company, BIS and the Department have reviewed the framework agreement, 
which sets out the broad framework in which the Company should operate, but have 
not updated the document with the changes they identified are needed. The current 
agreement was drawn up in 2009 by the Department for Innovation, Universities & Skills. 
The Cabinet Office code of practice on governance says that framework agreements 
should be updated every three to five years, or when there is a change in senior leadership.2
2.11 Every year, the Department writes an annual performance and resource agreement 
letter to the Company. This confirms the priorities for the coming financial year and sets 
out the annual budget and performance measures and levels expected. The agreement 
for 2016-17 was not issued until 6 October 2016. The agreement for 2017-18 was not 
issued until December 2017. As an interim measure, the Department wrote to the 
Company at the start of each year to confirm the Company’s budget for its core activities 
and board-approved change projects, but did not set out its priorities or performance 
measures. The view of the chair and a number of the Company directors is that the lack 
of an agreement was an unsatisfactory position for the governance of the Company.
1 Comptroller and Auditor General, Departments’ oversight of arm’s-length bodies: a comparative study,  
Session 2016-17, HC 507, National Audit Office, July 2016.
2 HM Treasury and Cabinet Office, Corporate governance in central government departments: code of good practice, 
April 2017.
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2.12 When the Company appoints a new chief executive officer, the Department should 
write to them as accounting officer to formally delegate authority for expenditure and 
payments that contribute to the Department’s objectives. BIS wrote to the Company’s 
previous chief executive officer setting out these delegated tasks. It stated that all 
income and expenditure should be managed according to the guidance set out in 
Managing Public Money. It also stated that any breach of the conditions could result in 
disciplinary action. BIS did not send either the interim chief executive officer or Mr Lamey 
a delegation letter. The Department told us that the letter issued to the previous chief 
executive officer was “evergreen”, so there was no need to issue a similar letter to 
Mr Lamey, as the rules continued to apply. However, the letter to the previous chief 
executive officer stated that the delegation would “remain in force until further notice 
or such time as you personally cease to be the post holder”.
2.13 BIS sent Mr Lamey a letter on his appointment as accounting officer. It drew 
Mr Lamey’s attention to Managing Public Money (which refers to the Nolan principles 
of public life) and other guidance that describes the conduct required of senior civil 
servants and accounting officers.3 The Department also provided training on the 
responsibilities of an accounting officer to Mr Lamey. Mr Lamey’s contract also stated 
that the Company’s code of conduct formed part of his terms and conditions of 
employment and reflected the Nolan principles of public life.
The Department’s management of risk
2.14 A number of changes to the Company occurred in 2016. The Department took 
on responsibility for the Company from BIS in July 2016. This occurred soon after the 
Company had appointed five new non-executive directors in March 2016 and Mr Lamey 
in June 2016. BIS had a large number of arm’s-length bodies, and a structure and 
governance to oversee them, which the Department did not have. The Department 
relied on the transfer of staff from the BIS sponsor team for expertise. The Department 
told us that it adopted a lighter-touch approach to overseeing the Company than BIS 
to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy. The Department did not review the risks arising 
from these changes, and did not consider whether its oversight arrangements were 
appropriate and sufficient.
3 HM Treasury, Managing Public Money, July 2013
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2.15 The Department did not assess the impact on oversight of changes that Mr Lamey 
made to the Company’s governance. During his tenure, Mr Lamey decided that having 
four to six executive team members in attendance at board meetings was unnecessary. 
From September 2016, with the board’s approval, Mr Lamey reduced attendance of 
executives at the board to himself and the deputy chief executive officer, and other 
members of the executive by invitation only. In reporting to the board Mr Lamey also 
combined the finance report from the responsible executive director into his own chief 
executive officer’s report. These measures reduced the amount of contact between 
executives and board members. The Department discussed the need to have a qualified 
person responsible for finance on the Company’s executive leadership team with the 
Company. An assessor told Mr lamey on 11 May 2017 that the Company had not been 
in breach of the HM Treasury’s Managing Public Money guidance to date and that, 
in order to maintain good practice during his redesign of the Company’s executive 
team, Mr Lamey should engage the Department’s chief finance officer to reassure him 
that the Company has the financial leadership needed for an organisation of its size 
and complexity.
Department’s awareness of Mr Lamey’s actions
2.16 The Department was aware of Mr Lamey’s plans to make redundancies as part of 
his reorganisation. In September 2016 the Department and the Company revised the 
expenditure control framework, and what approvals the Company needed, including 
for redundancies, payment in lieu of notice and confidentiality clauses. Mr Lamey 
contributed to this review. At least one assessor has attended every board meeting 
following Mr Lamey’s appointment. There was also an assessor at every audit and 
risk committee and remuneration committee meeting. Consequently, the Department 
was aware of Mr Lamey’s plans to restructure the executive leadership team as early 
as September 2016, and was present for the discussion of the likely redundancies in 
January 2017. At its January meeting, the remuneration committee, with representatives 
from the Department present, agreed “subject to the necessary board approvals” the 
redundancy of up to three existing executives as part of Mr Lamey’s redesign of the 
executive leadership team. The Department told us that it discussed severance options 
with Mr Lamey but did not check that the correct procedures had been followed.
2.17 The Department was also aware in January 2017 of Mr Lamey’s plans to lease a 
new building. The Company anticipated the need for a new building and identified this in 
its risk report. In February 2017 Mr Lamey asked his team to find new premises ready to 
occupy by 1 May 2017. Mr Lamey informed the February 2017 board meeting, with the 
Department’s assessors present, that the Company was working with the Government 
Property Unit to obtain additional accommodation. Later, the Company’s head of estates 
told Mr Lamey that he needed Cabinet Office approval. Mr Lamey told him to press 
ahead. The Department did not check that the correct procedures had been followed.
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2.18 Departmental officials were at the November 2016 conference when Mr Lamey was 
openly critical of the Company and repeatedly used various inaccurate and exaggerated 
narratives, including about specific individuals in the Company.
2.19 The Department attended the Company’s audit and risk committee so the 
Department was aware of assurances provided by internal auditors and reports of 
matters arising from the work of the Company’s external auditors. Neither auditor 
identified or raised concerns until after the whistleblowers had come forward. 
In March 2018, the Company’s external auditors, KPMG, gave a qualified regularity 
opinion in the Company’s accounts for 2016-17 where the Company had failed to 
obtain required approvals in two areas. In the first area, the Company did not obtain 
approvals for confidentiality clauses that deviated from the standard wording provided 
by the Cabinet Office, and for making a payment in lieu of notice within one settlement 
agreement. In the second area, the Company let two call-off contracts, which included 
digital and technology expenditure, for which it did not obtain the required approvals 
from the Cabinet Office or the Department. For other expenditure procured through 
the G-Cloud framework, KPMG could not obtain sufficient, appropriate audit evidence 
to demonstrate the regularity of the expenditure. 
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Part Three
Lessons learned
The executive
3.1 The Department for Education (the Department) is supporting the Student 
Loans Company (the Company) in making senior appointments to strengthen its 
executive leadership team. As well as identifying an interim chief finance officer, the 
Department identified an experienced interim chief executive officer, who took up post 
in November 2017, and an interim chief information officer. The Company has appointed 
a new chief finance officer and has started the process to recruit a permanent chief 
executive officer. 
3.2 The acting and interim chief executive officers in place since Mr Lamey left told us 
that they have changed the way the executive team reports to the board, for example to 
improve finance and procurement procedures. Executives will attend board meetings 
more frequently. The chief finance officer’s report to the board has been reinstated and 
will be separate from the chief executive officer’s report. 
Governance reviews
3.3 The Department is working with UK Government Investments to review its 
oversight and governance of the Company. In phase one the Department is considering 
how the current governance arrangements are operating, whether they work well, 
and whether they could be improved in the short to medium term. The Department is 
discussing the results of the review, and its recommendations, with the Company and 
devolved administrations, including plans to revise the framework document. Phase one 
should be completed by June 2018. The Department has not yet set terms of reference 
or a timescale for phase two, which is likely to examine the Company’s operating model 
for the longer term.
3.4 The Department is also looking at how it works with its arm’s-length bodies 
and aims to have clear lines of accountability between it and them. It told us that, for 
each body it sponsors, it is reviewing arrangements and aims to have a proportionate 
approach to assurance, based on each body’s purpose and a mutual understanding 
of risk. The Department plans to complete this work by January 2019. 
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Updating policies
3.5 The Company is reviewing its policies and structures and is making changes 
to improve its governance and oversight. The chair of the remuneration committee 
told us that the committee’s terms of reference were not robust enough to prevent 
individuals from avoiding seeking proper approvals, for example for agreements on 
termination of employment. The Company agreed new terms of reference for the 
remuneration committee in February 2018. They now explicitly state that, in future, 
the committee will approve the detailed terms of every executive’s termination 
agreement before they are discussed or agreed with the executive concerned. 
The remuneration committee also plans to review the Company’s human resources 
policies, including its policy for whistleblowing. 
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Appendix One
Our investigative approach
Scope
1 Our investigation focuses on the Department for Education’s (the Department’s) 
oversight of the Student Loans Company (the Company). It does not reinvestigate the 
allegations of the two whistleblowers. It sets out the facts about the Department’s 
response to the allegations by the whistleblowers. It does not conclude on the correctness 
of the Government Internal Audit Agency’s or Sir Paul Jenkins’ investigations, nor the 
correctness of the decisions of the disciplinary and appeals panels. Our investigation 
begins with the recruitment of Mr Lamey in 2016, and finishes in mid-April 2018. 
Methods
2 In examining these issues, we drew on a variety of evidence sources. 
3 We conducted semi-structured interviews with staff and non-executive directors 
from the Company and with staff from the Department and reviewed internal documents 
to establish the systems of oversight and governance in place, what happened following 
the whistleblowers’ allegations, and the action taken by the Department once the 
allegations had been made. 
4 We conducted semi-structured interviews with both whistleblowers and the former 
chief executive officer. 
5 We conducted semi-structured interviews with Sir Paul Jenkins and with staff 
from the Government Internal Audit Agency concerning the conduct of a findings from 
their investigations.
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6 We reviewed government documents of current practice in oversight of 
arm’s-length bodies. We also reviewed a number of documents from the Department 
and the Company including: 
• internal management documents, briefings and meeting minutes concerning the 
oversight and governance of the Student Loans Company; 
• internal documents including briefings, objectives, appraisals and records of 
meetings concerning the appointment and performance of Mr Lamey;
• internal documents setting out the changes to the governance of the Student 
Loans Company and the reviews being undertaken by the Department;
• the two investigation reports, including appendices containing the underlying 
evidence, commissioned by the Company and the Department;
• the papers setting out the findings of the disciplinary and appeal panels, and 
available transcripts; 
• board papers and minutes; 
• minutes and papers from the Company’s remuneration committee and audit and 
risk committee; 
• whistleblowing and disciplinary policies; 
• correspondence between the whistleblowers, the Company, the Department and 
others; and 
• the Department and the Company’s annual report and accounts. 
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